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INRODUCnON
Leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") and takeovers of American corpo-
rations have become favorite topics of discussion among legal and
economic scholars' and favorite games of choice among lawyers and
businessmen.2 These LBOs and takeovers present policy makers
with an intriguing dilemma because of the persuasiveness of both
their potential benefits and their harmful effects. Corporate takeover
specialists often succeed in unseating ineffective management and in
allocating resources more efficiently by divesting companies that
have become too large and diverse of unproductive assets.' At the
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I See, e.g, Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Controk A Critical Analysis and Proposals
for Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 867 (1987) (proposing federal legislation to
maximize shareholder interests in the hostile takeover context); Booth, Management
Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 639-
45 (1985) (discussing issues of fiduciary duty that arise in the context of buyouts);
Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DuKE
L.J. 92, 143-58 (analyzing the changing legal conceptions of the relationship between
debtholder and corporate issuers); Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An
Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 435 (arguing for
state regulation to encourage a more equitable sharing of takeover gains with
stakeholders); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1981) (proposing a passivity
thesis for target management premised on the assumption that antitakeover
maneuvers decrease shareholder wealth); Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw.
247, 248 (1989) (advocating the Unocal test's intermediate substantive standard for
review of directors' actions in a takeover); Upton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1987) (warning that the takeover boom
is ushering in a dangerous new age of corporate governance); Comment, Judicial
Review ofAntitakeover Devices Employed in the Noncoercive Tender Offer Context: Making Sense
of the Unocal Test, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 227-29 (1989) (discussing the Unocal test's
failure to provide a coherent framework for assessing the legitimacy of antitakeover
devices).
2 See generally J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME (1987) (discussing the evolution
of takeover activity on Wall Street); B. BURROUGH &J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE (1990) (recounting the battle to takeover RJR Nabisco).
3 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). Justice White, writing for
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same time, however, the "takeover artists" cut jobs and salaries, 4
inject unprecedented high levels of debt into companies,5 and often
are accused of not being committed to the long-term growth and
stability of the enterprises they acquire.6 Thus, these takeovers
result in both social benefits and social costs.7
In analyzing corporate acquisition regulation, it is essential to
isolate the point where the social costs of these transactions, in terms
of displacement and risk that the economy as a whole is forced to
bear, outweigh their social benefits. At this point, preserving com-
munities and jobs and insuring the long-term financial health of the
country overshadow the goals of proper resource allocation and
ousting entrenched, inefficient management.8
Corporate acquisition regulation, however, is not the only finan-
the Court, recognized three potential benefits of takeovers: (1) shareholders'
"opportunity to sell their shares at a premium," (2) "[the reallocation of economic
resources to their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and
competition," and (3) "[t]he incentive [for] ... incumbent management to perform
well so that stock prices remain high." Id. A recent study examining both failed and
successful buyouts confirms that buyouts generally do increase efficiency:
manufacturing plants recently acquired in leveraged transactions increased
productivity at a rate 14 percent higher than those which were not bought out. See
Passell, Buyout Fever: The Patient Lives, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at D2, col. 1.
4 See Lipton, supra note 1, at 25-26. In one poignant example, Owens-Coming
cut its workforce from 28,000 to 15,000, as part of a restructuring to fend off a
takeover attempt by Wickes Corporation in 1986. See O'Brien & Kline, An RxforJobs
Lost Through Mergers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, § 4, at 23, col. 2.
5 See Lipton, supra note 1, at 20 ("Abusive takeovers have increased the amount
of debt in our economy to extraordinary proportions."). During the recent economic
expansion, debt of United States nonfinancial corporations has increased by $840
billion, while equity has decreased by $300 billion. Interest on the debt totals
twenty-six percent of internal cash flow, an all-time high. This "decapitalization" of
United States industry is due, in large part, to mergers and LBOs. See Kaufman,
Halting the Leverage Binge, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1989, at 23.
6 See Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARv. Bus. REv.,
July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 68-70 (noting that American corporations have sacrificed long-
term investments in bringing new ideas to market). In the Owens-Coming
restructuring, described supra note 4, the company cut research and development
spending in half and fired 480 research employees. See Willoughby, What a Raider
Hath Wrought, FORBES, Mar. 23, 1987, at 56.
7 See Reich, Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 32, 36 ("To the extent that they allocate capital efficiently to where
it can be most productive, [LBOs] make our economy perform better. But... one
must ask whether these benefits are worth what we are paying for them, in terms of
both direct costs and future productivity.").
8 This is not to say that the preservation of communities and the financial good
health of the country are conditions that cannot exist when there is proper resource
allocation and efficient management. It is only when the framework regulating
corporate finance distorts the economic choices, as it presently does, that these two
sets of conditions become, to a degree, mutually exclusive.
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cial concern on policymakers' agenda. Another major economic
issue demanding legal attention is foreign participation in the Ameri-
can marketplace. Modem consumers perceive that the Japanese pro-
duce higher-quality durable goods, particularly cars, than do
Americans, and this perception is not without sound foundation.
9
Moreover, Japan has surpassed the United States in several frontier
technologies, including superconductors and high definition televi-
sion. 10 One does not need sophisticated marketing acumen to
understand that superior products in mature industries and a tech-
nological edge in developing ones leads to an increase in market
share. As a result, even ignoring any unfair trade practices, the
American trade imbalance has remained at intolerable levels."
Furthermore, the Japanese consumer's high individual savings
rate relative to her American counterpart has contributed to an
increasing American dependence on Japanese capital to finance
investment activity in the United States.' 2 This combined influx of
9 See Rights and Wrongs of BlamingJapan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1989, at A20, col. 1
(noting that American consumers believe Japan manufactures higher quality durable
goods). The Japanese have captured over 207o of the U.S. automobile market and
have abided by "voluntary" quotas to avoid further inroads. See House, The '90s &
Beyond- Though Rich, Japan Is Poor in Many Elements of Global Leadership, Wall St. J., Jan.
30, 1989, at Al, col 1.
10 See House, supra note 9, at A8 (stating that "many businessmen ... envy
Japan's technological prowess," especially their "feats on the frontiers of high
technology"). TheJapanese edge in high definition television has prompted cries by
U.S. companies for government support. Japanese success in superconductors led to
the formation of an American collaborative effort, the now-defunct U.S. Memories,
Inc. See Clark, What Strategy Can Do for Technology, HAv. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989,
at 94, 96; Pollack, Memory Chip Cooperative Is Officially Declared Dead, N.Y. Times, Jan.
16, 1990, at D1, col. 1.
11 The United States trade deficit for 1988 was $137.34 billion, down from
$170.32 billion in 1987. See Stout, Trade Picture Isn't Improving, Analysts Say, Wall St.J.,
Feb. 21, 1989, at A2, col. 2. For the first 11 months of 1989, the trade deficit eased
by $6 billion, to $101.7 billion, compared to the same period in 1988. See Trade Gap
Widened in November, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at D1, col. 6. Analysts attribute the
trade problem to "a very serious competitive problem in the country" and propose
several solutions, including improving the quality of American products, increasing
the productivity of the American worker, and keeping the dollar exchange rate low.
See Stout, supra, at A2. Japanese officials advise the United States to invest in research
and development, upgrade education, close the Federal budget deficit, and
encourage saving. See Weisman, Japan, Weary of Barbs on Trade, Tells Americans Why
They Trail, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1989, at Al, col 3. U.S. legislators are considering
specific proposals to promote saving, including one to encourage use of Individual
Retirement Accounts. See Nash, Persuading Americans To Save, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17,
1989, § 3, at 1, col. 4.
12 The United States savings rate, as a percentage of disposable income, is now
4.2%, far below the 16% Japanese rate. See Sebastian, Baby Boomers Find It Hard to
Save Money: Will They Do It Later?, Wall St.J., Feb. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 6. There is
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foreign goods and foreign capital contributes greatly to two other
domestic burdens: the budget deficit, which puts upward pressure
on real interest rates, 3 and the decline of the dollar in terms of both
relative value and international prominence. 14 It is not surprising,
then, that as a result of all of these considerations, some observers
believe that Japan already has replaced America as the economic
leader of the world. 15
Accordingly, just as many people have concluded that legal
steps should be taken to curb takeovers,' 6 so too has there been
reason to expect the American savings rate to increase as the baby boomers reach
their savings years, after they have accumulated the necessary durable goods and
satisfied their housing needs. See R. POZDENA, THE MODERN ECONOMICS OF HOUSING
117-18 (1988). However, many experts are skeptical that this generation, raised in
relatively prosperous times, will save like their predecessors did. See Sebastian, supra,
at Al, col. 6 ("Nobody believes it...").
The low U.S. savings rate cannot finance the steady growth and prolific
borrowing that has occurred in the U.S. during the mid-late 1980s. See L. NEVAER &
S. DECK, CORPORATE FINANCIAL PIANNING AND MANAGEMENT IN A DEFICIT ECONOMY
14-28 (1987). The Japanese have provided the necessary funding to fuel further
American growth. They were attracted in the mid-1980s by real estate and equity
opportunities and in the last two years by high interest rates on bonds. See id The
Japanese in 1987 had almost $35 billion in direct United States investments and were
buying 25-30% of Treasury bond issues. See House, supra note 9, at A8. The danger
lies in the dependence; the United States needs Japanese capital to continue growing
and funding its deficits. As opportunities open up elsewhere for Japanese investors
(in the European Community, for example), however, United States interest rates
must rise to retain the capital. See id.; L. NEVAER & S. DECK, supra, at 2 1.
IS Interest rates must remain high to attract sufficient foreign capital to fund
United States deficits. See Lowenstein,Japan Market Woes Raise Fears of Pullback in U.S.,
Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1990, at C1, col. 2 (describing how a rise in Japanese interest
rates would result in a reduction of the interest rate spread between the United States
and Japan, thereby reducing the incentive for Japanese to put their money in the
Unites States). Thus, since the United States began running large budget deficits
during the Carter years, real interest rates (long-term interest rate minus the inflation
rate) have risen consistently. See L. NEVEAR & S. DECK supra note 12, at xii. High
interest rates tend to stifle economic growth. See id.
14 The decline of the dollar, fiom about 180-220 yen in the early 1980s to about
145 yen today, see Business Digest, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at Dl, col. 1, is a
phenomenon related to budget deficits and high interest rates. As foreign exchange
markets lose confidence in the dollar because of deficits, United States interest rates
must rise to maintain foreign investment. See L. NEVEAR & S. DECK, supra note 12, at
xii.
15 See, e.g., Thank You, Japan, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1989, at 12-13 (praising
Japan's conduct as the world's biggest creditor and new economic leader); House,
supra note 9, at Al (describing the world leadership position Japan has secured
through its economic prowess).
16 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Tender Offer
Reform - Part I. Hearing Before The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987) (Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987) (proposing regulation of
takeover activity, including requiring public disclosure within 24 hours after an entity
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clamor to insulate America from foreign competition.17 These pro-
tectionist proponents, however, appear to have forgotten that legis-
lation proposed in the face of a threat often fails to consider the evils
it may create.1 8 Erecting barriers against foreign competition would
harm consumers, choking off the flow of cheaper or higher-quality
goods to them, and prompt retaliatory responses from affected
nations. It also would halt the growth of a world marketplace, to
acquires more than five percent of the shares of a publicly held corporation,
prohibiting certain "greenmail" transactions, extending the minimum offering
period for tender offers, and providing the SEC with increased rulemaking
authority). Many commentators favor dissuading two-tiered bids, either through
regulation or general adoption of poison pills. See Greene &Junewicz, A Reappraisal
of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 691-93 (1984)
(recommending regulation of partial and two-tier tender offers); Lipton, supra note 1,
at 69-71 (advocating adoption of a "second generation pill," which includes both a
"flip-over" provision to guard against squeeze-out mergers and bust-up takeovers,
and a "flip-in" provision, designed to prevent undesired partial acquisitions);
Comment, supra note 1, at 269-70 (proposing a reinterpretation of Delaware law that
would facilitate the use of antitakeover devices for the first sixty days following an
initial tender offer proposal). A number of tax disincentives for takeovers have been
proposed. See Sheppard, Should Junk Bond Interest Deductions Be Disallowed? 34 TAx
NoTEs 1142, 1142-46 (1987) (discussing proposals to eliminate the corporate
interest deduction for junk bonds); Reich, supra note 7, at 32 (recommending
allowing deductibility of dividends as well as debt, and disallowing deductibility of
interest payments on very large borrowings used to purchase corporate stock);
Buffett, How To Tame the Casino Society, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1986, at A23, col. 3
(proposing a 100% tax on trading profits obtained by holding a stock for less than
one year). The Treasury Department is currently at work on a plan to eliminate the
double taxation of dividends, which Secretary Nicholas Brady believes has
encouraged debt-financed takeovers. See Murray, Treasury Seeks To End Double Taxation
of Dividends, Mulls Corporate-Levy Rise, Wall St.J.,Jan. 16, 1990, at A18. There is also
considerable support for intracorporate defenses, such as poison pills.
17 In response to mounting public pressure for such protections, Congress
recently enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107 (1988). The Act authorizes Presidential action on trade matters, and
commentators suggest the President will be required to use this lever in the future.
See Bello & Holmer, Unilateral Action to Open Foreign Markets: The Mechanics of
Retaliation Exercises, 22 INT'L. LAw. 1197, 1197-98 (1988).
1s For example, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46
Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1662 (1988)), designed
to curb foreign competition, may have helped bring on the Great Depression. See
Isaac & Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 CAmH. U.L. REV., 281,
286 n.22 (1988).
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which the beginnings of capitalism in China 9 and perestroika in the
Soviet Union 20 can be partially attributed.
This sketch of the dangers posed by takeovers and foreign com-
petition highlights the fact that "knee-jerk" tactics will not suffice to
counter these dangers. Actions which directly curb takeovers or
block foreign competition may be counterproductive. Instead,
!-wmakers and academics have the responsibility to determine the
root cause of these problems in order to develop a thoughtful reme-
dial strategy. The first questions must be why has there been such an
explosion of takeover activity, and why are Japan and other nations
now able to dominate the United States in international economic
competition?
This Comment proposes a simple answer to these questions:
the United States no longer possesses the most efficient economy in
the world. This reality manifests itself in many ways, from the
decreasing relative productivity of the American worker2 1 to the
related erosion of our education system.2 2 Most importantly for pur-
poses of this Comment, the inefficiency of the American economy
19 See Worthy, China Tests its Capitalist Skills, FORTUNE, Oct. 24, 1988, at 174
(stating that Deng Xiaoping began a "drive to free the Chinese economy from
Communist dogma and ... [Chinese] enterprises are striving to become significant
participants in world markets."). ,China, however, has not yet absorbed the full effect
of the June 4, 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square. See Is Hongkong Healing?,
INsTnrtIONAL INVESTOR, Sept., 1989, at 307 (finding that the massacre shook
"people's trust in the Beijing government and made it difficult to plan for the
future").
20 See Flanigan, The Payoff in Making Soviets Our Customers, L.A. Times, Oct. 8,
1989, § 4, at 1, col. 1 (noting that Soviet-United States economic cooperation
facilitates Soviet cultural and political change); Clines, Soviets and 6 U.S. Concerns Sign
Trade Pact, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at D4, col. 3 (same).
The recent collapse of the communist regimes in Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, arid Romania can also be tied to a desire on the part
of those peoples to participate in the world marketplace. See Herrhausen, Toward a
Unified Germany, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, § 3, at 2 (noting that the rapid changes in
Eastern Europe are attributable to people "becoming receptive to the Western ideas
of democracy and market-oriented systems").
21 See Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 6, at 69.
22 The Wall Street Journal recently published a comprehensive report on the
current state of American education and its future prospects. It began with the
premise that "the U.S. education fhctory is obsolete," see Graham, Retooling the Schools,
Wall St.J., Mar. 31, 1989, at RI, R3, and it concluded that a key element in resolving
the problem is for businesses and students to match needs with skills. See Lopez,
System Failure, Wall St.J., Mar. 31, 1989, at R12; see also Perry, Saving the Schools: How
Business Can Help, FORTUNE, Nov. 7, 1988, at 42 ("American schools are producing an
army of illiterates. Companies that cannot hire enough skilled workers now realize
they must do something to save the public schools. Not to be charitable.... but to
survive.").
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can be traced to improper incentives in the legal regime governing
corporate investment choices. This Comment concentrates on the
preference that the legal structure creates in favor of corporate inter-
nal and debt financing over equity financing. Encouraging corpora-
tions to finance projects through equity has considerable economic
advantages which largely have been ignored, leading to a perverse
legal regime that discourages the use of equity.23 This Comment
takes issue with the current legal financing structure, exploring two
feasible methods for resurrecting the advantages of equity financing.
First, Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission must over-
haul the securities laws and regulations to remove their current dis-
incentives to issuing equity. Second, Congress and the Internal
Revenue Service must eliminate the artificial tax preference afforded
to debt and internal financing.
This Comment does not assume that the promotion of equity
financing by American corporations alone will correct the inefficien-
cies in the economy which led to the wave of takeovers and the
onslaught of foreign competition. Rather, it attempts to expose a
fundamental problem and suggest a legal remedy with real
macroeconomic effect. It is easy to point fingers at corporate raiders
and foreigners, but it is more difficult to recognize that both groups
are responding to the fact that the American economic machine does
not efficiently allocate its resources to their highest-valued use.
American companies are slow to bring high-quality, affordable prod-
ucts to market, a weakness that the Japanese are exploiting.24 Also,
the stocks of American companies often are undervalued in relation
to the price their assets could bring, a market weakness that corpo-
rate raiders are exploiting.2" One partial solution to these ills lies in
23 The advantages of equity financing are being demonstrated by Japanese
corporations, which are currently undertaking a massive refinancing into equity, in
the amount of $130 billion in 1988. See Glynn, Fall's Trendiest Fashion: Equity,
INsTrrU ToNAL INVESTOR, Nov., 1989, at 151, 157. In the first eight months of 1989,
Japanese corporations raised more than $110 billion, compared with $20 billion by
American companies. See Sterngold, Japan Leading U.S. in Raising Capital for
Corporations, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 6. The new equity money is being
used to improve balance sheets, to pay for research and development, and to finance
foreign acquisitions. In fact, "[e]quity finance is proving so powerful a lever that the
dimensions of Japanese takeovers abroad may be limited only by fear of political
backlash - not by any financial constraints." Glynn, supra, at 157.
24 Commentators suggest that the main reason large, technology-based
American companies have been lagging behind foreign competitors is that the
American companies are less adept at translating an idea into a marketable product.
See Markoff, A Prescription for Troubled IBM, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, § 3, at 4.
25 See generally Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HIav. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61.
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changing the legal rules to encourage using equity markets for
financing corporate needs. The reasons why equity financing will
improve efficiency, and why adjustments in the tax and securities
laws will result in more equity financing, are explained in greater
detail below. The threats to America's future economic leadership
provide a background for tlhe discussion that follows.
I. BENEFITS OF ENCOURAGING EQurrY FINANCING
Equity financing enables corporations to raise money by selling
ownership interests (represented by shares of stock) to investors.
Every corporation is authorized to issue a specified number of
shares, 26 and corporate laws generally are designed to insure that
every share is issued at a fair price relative to the assets it repre-
sents. 27 Moreover, in the context of large corporations which are
either publicly-held or going public, there are established trading
markets which provide a ready pool of buyers for these shares.
28
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), state "Blue Sky"
laws, and the exchange markets regulate the actual issuance of
shares. The basic objective of most of this regulation is to ensure
proper disclosure of material information concerning the stock.29
Understanding this economic and regulatory environment, a corpo-
ration seeking to obtain outside financing through an equity offering
has three general concerns:
1. How do the corporate laws limit the number of shares that the
corporation can issue and the price that it can obtain for these
shares?
2. Who are the buyers, and what price does the market indicate
they are willing to pay?
26 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) (1983 & Supp. 1988) (stating that
the articles of incorporation must prescribe the classes of shares and the number of
shares of each class that the corporation is authorized to issue); REV. MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.01(a) (1989) (same).
27 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 153(a) - (b) (1983) (stating that stock with
par value must be issued at value at: least equal to capital, while no-par shares must be
issued at a price set by the board of directors); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 6.21(c) (1989) (the Official Comment to this section states that setting the issuance
price "involves honest and fair judgments by directors").
28 Major United States markets include the New York Stock Exchange,
American Stock Exchange, Over-the-Counter Market, and Pacific Exchange.
29 See S.E.C., THE WORK OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1986),
(stating that the securities laws were designed to facilitate informed investment
analyses and decisions by the investing public, primarily by ensuring adequate
disclosure of material information), reprinted in L. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES
REGULATION 2-3 (2d ed. 1988).
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3. What are the substantive and procedural requirements
imposed by the securities laws on a sale of the corporation's
shares?
The above discussion is not meant to imply that all equity offer-
ings are alike. Indeed, there are two types of equity issuance. The
first is called an initial public offering, and it occurs when a company
"goes public," selling its stock on a major exchange for the first
time.Sc The second is called a "seasoned issue," occurring when an
established public company sells shares from its supply of authorized
but unissued stock.a This Comment focuses only on the latter class
of equity offerings, seasoned issues, because their benefits more
clearly reflect the basic advantages of encouraging equity financing.
It is these public offerings, on major exchanges and by large corpora-
tions, that should be facilitated, rather than discouraged, by the tax
and securities laws.
A. A Greater Number of Equity Financings by All Public Corporations
Would Result in Better Aggregate Capital Allocation
At present, equity financings represent a negligible percentage
of total corporate financing.32 The macroeconomic factors discussed
in this part, however, suggest that equity issuances should play a sig-
nificantly greater role in funding corporate projects and expansion.
1. The Concepts of Efficiency and Capital Allocation
In a recent article, Professor Lynn Stout laments the time and
energy expended on the part of lawmakers, judges, and scholars in
enhancing the efficiency of the stock market because, he concludes,
S0 See Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricng and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 646 (1988).
31 See id. The issues are called "seasoned" because a market has already been
established in the corporation's stock.
32 See id. at 645 & n.179 ("Firms rarely use equity issues to raise capital.");
Reich, supra note 7, at 32 ("During the 1980's new issues of common stock averaged
only about 1 percent of the total stock outstanding; the action was in the 99 percent
of shares already in circulation."). Only $85 billion in common stock was sold to the
public between 1980 and 1984. See Smith, Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition
Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1986). Compare this to the $5.2 trillion in outstanding
stock that was traded on registered exchanges between 1978 and 1985. See NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BooK 74 (1986).
While Japanese companies raise equity, which is being used to finance "a new
industrial revolution" as well as major acquisitions in the United States, American
CFOs, by contrast, "remain devotees to the cult of leverage." See Glynn, supra note
23, at 157.
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market efficiency is insignificant.3" Professor Stout admits that due
to extensive legislative safeguards and judicial sensitivity to efficiency
concerns, the stock market has become an incredibly efficient mecha-
nism for incorporating information into share prices. 34  The
Supreme Court, in fact, has accepted the theory that the stock market
is almost perfectly efficient with regard to incorporating currently
available information.3s  But Professor Stout argues that this effi-
ciency is meaningless, and the efforts which produce it wasted, since
the market serves almost no capital allocation function3 6 Address-
ing seasoned issues, Professor Stout relies on the fact that corpora-
tions almost never enter the market for their capital needs.
3 7
Accordingly, the perfectly efficient market has very little say in which
companies should get money or in which projects companies should
finance.
38
Instead of resting with the criticism that the equity markets go
largely unused for corporate financing purposes, Professor Stout fur-
ther argues that resources are being wasted in maintaining and
enhancing market efficiency. s9 This Comment takes issue with the
latter argument. The efficient market is a valuable tool waiting to be
employed in the essential process of allocating capital to its most
productive use.
Classical economic theorists recognize efficient capital allocation
33 See Stout, supra note 30, at 618. The kind of efficiency referred to both in
Stout's article and this Comment is Pareto optimality/Pareto superiority. A resource
allocation is Pareto optimal when any possible reallocation to make someone better
off necessarily makes someone else worse off. A resource allocation is Pareto
superior if it makes someone better off without making anyone worse off. See
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 509, 512-13
(1980).
34 See Stout, supra note 30, at 615-16.
35 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988) (acknowledging
efficient stock markets in accepting the fraud-on-the-market theory).
36 See Stout, supra note 30, at 642-56.
37 See id. at 645-51; see also sources cited supra note 32 (stating that American
corporations now rarely use the equity markets to raise capital).
38 The activity on the exchanges is comprised almost totally 9f trading in
secondary issues. See supra note 32. From a pure capital allocation standpoint, this
trading is wasteful. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 1175 n.38
("Expenditures that influence the distribution of trading gains but do not generate
better performance are simple waste.").
39 See Stout, supra note 30, at 696-709. The Supreme Court supports efficiency,
even at the expense of other goals. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983)
(refusing to extend insider trading liability because to do so would impair efficiency).
It is also clear that the SEC is willing to expend resources on enhancing efficiency.
See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF
1983, H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, 22 (1983).
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as a prerequisite to economic development. 40 Hence, the existence
of a market mechanism that will determine which projects are likely
to produce sufficient benefits, in the form of profits, to warrant
financing, is an economic necessity. When capital-allocating markets
such as the stock market are efficient, the participants in such mar-
kets are able to make the correct decisions about which projects to
undertake. The market encourages wise decisions simply by
assigning a relatively low cost of capital to those projects which are
expected to be successful. The efficiency of this assignment process,
however, depends upon correct information rapidly reaching the
market participants.
2. How Capital Is Allocated Among Corporations in Today's
Financing Environment
Large public corporations are the locus of domestic project
development. 41 This concentration of power over capital allocation
decisions is a logical evolutionary occurrence, resulting from the
economies of scale enjoyed by these large corporations. The func-
tion of capital markets in an economic environment dominated by
large corporations is to allocate capital properly among large corpo-
rations. Thus, it is necessary to examine how the American capital
markets presently perform in distinguishing among corporations
which need capital to undertake their various projects. The benefits
of encouraging the use of the stock market as a means of financing
will become evident in comparison.
The two primary means of corporate financing are internal and
external, with external financing divided into the subcategories of
debt and equity. Internal financing refers to the use of retained
earnings to fund corporate projects or expansion, and it is the pri-
mary financing choice for American corporations.42 Using company
money has the primary advantage, from management's perspective,
of allowing free choice. Management legally has almost complete
40 See, e.g., R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 63-65 (4th ed. 1975) (arguing
that the pricing mechanism of an efficient market enhances social welfare); P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 43-47 (9th ed. 1973) (same).
41 See M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY
337 (1987) (stating that the largest 500 corporations control 75% of the private
sector's assets).
42 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 312-14 (3d
ed. 1988) (illustrating that internal financing dominates sources and uses of
corporate funds); Stout, supra note 30, at 645 n.178 ("Retained earnings account for
the majority of corporate expenditures ... ").
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discretion over the use oF corporate funds,4" so it can invest in
projects without interference from outside parties. When employing
internal financing, management need not listen to the unsolicited
advice of commercial bankers, or, as long as it fulfills its fiduciary
duties, the input of shareholders. 44 Power to make decisions about
the future of the company thus vests in management. Since project
decision making is concentrated in large corporations, and manage-
ment makes unfettered investment decisions to the extent it uses the
favored method of internal financing, capital allocation decisions are
largely within the domain of corporate management.
The disadvantages generated when corporate management
comprises the capital allocation "market" are threefold. First, man-
agers do not always act in an economically rational way. Most man-
agers strive for power, and power in the corporate world is
symbolized by a company's sheer magnitude.45 Thus, managers are
driven toward expansion, whether or not this is economically appro-
priate. 46 Second, corporate managers often have faulty or incom-
43 See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 3.02 & 3.05 (1989) (allocating control
over corporate finances to management and directors, as opposed to shareholders);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (defining general powers of
directors and officers to manage the corporation); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701
(McKinney 1986) (same); see also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1361-75 (6th ed. 1988) (noting that corporate law allows
management discretion over whether to invest cash or pay it out in dividends).
44 It has long been established that courts may interfere on shareholders' behalf
if management acts in bad faith. See Dodge v. Ford, 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668
(1919). The Dodge court stipulated, however, that courts were not to "interfere in the
management [with respect to the financing decision] unless it is clearly made to
appear that they are guilty" of violating their duty of loyalty to the shareholders. See
id. at 500, 170 N.W. at 682 (quoting Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 83 Mich. 63,
71, 47 N.W. 131, 134 (1890)).
45 Largely as a consequence of the separation of ownership and control,
managers act to increase their personal power and prerogative, even at the expense
of the corporation. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1932). Congressional debate preceding the Securities Act
of 1933 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988)) recognized the self-
aggrandizement motive of management. See 77 CONG. REC. 2918 (1933) (statement
of Rep. Rayburn) (stating that "these few men, proud, arrogant, and blind, drove the
country to financial ruin").
Respected economists such as Joseph Shumpeter and Frank Knight pointed out
long ago the "empire building" motivation of corporate management. See W.
McEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 19 (1975). There is some
evidence that management strives for size because of the perceived protection from
takeover. See E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 101 (1981). The
takeover of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts may dispel this notion. See
Anders, RJR Finale Will Send Money Coursing, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1989, at C1, col. 3.
(describing KKR's takeover of RJR Nabisco, an enormous conglomerate).
46 There have been instances where corporations have built huge empires, with
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plete information about the full investment spectrum.47 Finally, the
tax law severely distorts managers' options for the use of corporate
funds. Management must choose between the retention and invest-
ment of earnings or the dividend disbursement of funds to share-
holders. Under current law, earnings that are paid out as dividends
to individuals are subject to taxes twice, with both the company and
the individual paying income tax.4 8 The second level of tax imposed
on dividends drives management to retain earnings and find some
way to invest them. In a no-tax world, a corporation would only
retain earnings when it could put the money to use more profitably
than its shareholders could. But in the real world, corporations with-
hold earnings to avoid double taxation, thus consciously and ration-
ally misallocating capital.
After internal financing, corporate managers' favorite choice of
funding is debt.49 Corporations undertake debt financing by selling
management seemingly oblivious to increasing shareholder return. See, e.g., Colvin,
The Bigness Cult's Grip on Beatrice Foods, FORTUNE, Sept. 20, 1982, at 122 (describing
Beatrice Foods' low return on shareholder equity, due primarily to the large number
of unprofitable companies it owned). The threat of takeover prompted Beatrice
ambitiously to divest 52 of its companies, beginning in 1983. See Mesdag, Beatrice's
Stock Buy, FORTUNE, Jan. 9, 1984, at I 11. Similarly, the RJ. Reynolds Corporation
owned Nabisco for less than five years before Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts acquired the
conglomerate and began dismantling it. See Smith & Waldman, KKR Assigns Goldman
Sachs to Solicit Bids for RJR Nabisco's Del Monte Unit, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1989, at A3,
col. 2 (noting that "Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. has launched its plan to sell food
assets of RJR Nabisco"); Anders, supra note 45, at C1 (describing KKR's takeover of
RJR Nabisco); Purdom, R.J. Reynolds Set to Pay $4.9 Billion for Nabisco, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1985, at Al, col. 3 (announcing the 1985 takeover of Nabisco by R.J.
Reynolds).
The stock market does not reward expansion solely for the purpose of
diversifying away the unique risk of a particular business. The market assumes that
shareholders can and do diversify their own portfolios.
47 Some commentators disagree with this premise, arguing that management
has superior access to intracorporate information, as compared to the capital market.
See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 145-48 (1975). This argument misses the point. The relevant
information concerns the entire range of investment opportunities in the
marketplace, and capital market participants are the most efficient processors of that
information.
Williamson asserts that internal corporate monitoring has become dominant
because evolution has proved it most effective. See Williamson, Organization Form,
Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control, 26J. L. & ECON. 351, 365-66 (1983). He fails
to account for the fact that this evolution was responding to disclosure requirements
and tax laws that favored (and continue to favor) internal control mechanisms.
48 See Murray, supra note 16, at 18.
49 See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that companies prefer debt to equity
primarily because of double taxation of dividends); Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle,
39 J. FIN. 575, 581-82 (1984) (noting that corporate managers prefer debt over
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bonds to investors or by obtaining long-term loans from financial
institutions."0 In either case, corporate management allows another
party to influence the capital allocation decision. This would be ben-
eficial if the bankers and bond investors (or rating services, which
perform the research upon which unsophisticated investors rely)
bring more information to corporate investment decision making.
Unfortunately, the reality of debt financing paints a different picture.
In terms of capital allocation, the disadvantages of debt financ-
ing closely parallel the disadvantages associated with internal financ-
ing. Although creditors perform some external assessment of a
particular corporation's capital project track record, 1 the nature of
the inputs they use to make the assessment reveals its limited useful-
ness. The credit assessment focuses almost exclusively on assigning
an interest rate to the debt of a corporation based primarily on two
factors: (1) prevailing interest rates and (2) risk of bankruptcy or
default.52 Prevailing interest rates, however, are not company-spe-
cific,55 so they do not serve to distinguish among companies compet-
ing for funds. This leaves the risk of bankruptcy as the major factor
that creditors use to assign a relative cost of capital to a debtor.
Thus, the contribution of large creditors to the capital allocation
process is limited merely to exposing those corporations which are
destined for failure.54 Beyond this point, the selection between
equity financing); see also M. Fox, supra note 41, at 270-82 (discussing internal, debt,
and equity financing, and the costs and benefits associated with each method).
50 Short-term bank loans for liquidity purposes are excluded from this
discussion.
51 A prospective debtholder'! assessment of the future growth prospects of a
major corporation is not as detailed as that undertaken by stock analysts. This is
because bond rating agencies lack the incentive to investigate closely the growth
potential or growth history of the company. See Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 58-59 (1982).
52 See Note, Auctioning New Issues of Corporate Securities, 71 VA. L. REv. 1381, 1403-
04 (1985).
53 Most banks use the universally available prime rate, to which they add a risk
premium, in computing what interest to charge their corporate customers. See R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 42, at 307.
54 This limited perspective by creditors regarding a borrowing corporation's
success is based on sound economic reasoning. Creditors are entitled to receive only
a fixed payment (principle plus interest) from the corporation on its loan. If the
corporation has the financial strength to make those fixed payments, it is generally
irrelevant to the creditor the rate of return the corporation receives on its investment
of the loan proceeds. On the other hand, shareholders are residual claimants to the
corporation's profits, so they "own" any money earned by the corporation over and
above that which is needed to pay all of the corporation's other obligations. Thus,
they have an incentive to maximize this "residual." See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting
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alternative investment choices is left with the same group that con-
trols internal financing deployment: management.
Almost all financing by established United States corporations is
done with either internal or debt financing.5" But as the discussion
above reveals, neither method effectively distinguishes among sol-
vent corporations with regard to their future prospects, a function
that is absolutely necessary for efficient capital allocation. Hence,
economic policymakers must find and encourage a more efficient
mechanism to perform this crucial function. Fortunately, they need
search no further than the remaining established source of corporate
financing.
3. Advantages of Equity Financing
Capital allocation would be improved markedly if corporations
were encouraged to finance their expansion or operations by issuing
stock on the equity market.56 An understanding of the mechanics of
capital allocation through the equity market is necessary before the
specific advantages can be enumerated and understood. Indeed, it is
within the mechanics of the equity market where equity's advantages
lie, dormant and largely unexploited.
According to at least one widely accepted theory, investors price
shares of stock according to the corporation's expected future
return,57 discounted for nondiversifiable risk.5" Many factors, both
systemic and company-specific, are considered in this equation, and
differences in opinion among market participants about the correct
price of stock are resolved through trading. Simply put, those inves-
in Corporate Law, 26J.L. & EcoN. 395, 403 (1983) (discussing shareholders' incentive
in making discretionary decisions relating to corporate income).
55 See supra notes 42 & 49.
56 Henry Manne first pointed out that corporations are disciplined in their
investment activity by capital market competition. See Coffee, Regulating the Marketfor
Corporate Controk A Critical Assessment Of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1234-35 (1984). His broad thesis has prompted significant
interest mostly in the context of tender offers, however. See id at 1234
("Corporations compete . . . in the capital market, where a poor return on the
investor's equity may elicit a tender offer.").
57 "Expected return" means the average of all possible returns, each discounted
for its probability. See W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 145-46 (1980).
58 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 42, at 137-40 (describing the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, a formula using expected return, defined as anticipated
dividends and appreciation produced by the corporation, and "beta", defined as
company-specific risk); Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 825-27 (1985) (discussing the operation of
the CAP-M model, and problems associated with it).
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tors who think the price is too low buy, while those who think the
price is too high sell. In this way, the experts reach a consensus
about a corporation's future prospects, and the trading price of the
company's stock reflects this consensus.
Absent transaction costs, a stock's market price dictates the
amount of money a corporation making an equity issue will receive
for selling a new share of stock. Assuming healthy trading volume in
the company's stock, market investors should be willing to absorb
the seasoned (newly issued) shares as readily as they buy the secon-
dary shares because the two are interchangeable.5 9 Moreover, issu-
ing new shares will not depress the per-share stock price, as long as
shareholders perceive that the corporation will earn a rate of return
on its investment of the new money received commensurate with that
earned on the corporation's other investments. 60 In such an envi-
ronment, the corporate financing decision involves only deciding
how much money is needed, and dividing this total by the market
price-per-share to arrive at the number of shares it needs to issue to
finance its project.
A corporation's market share-price is thus directly determinative
of its cost of capital. For example, postulate two companies with the
exact same asset value and current profitability. Assume that despite
the identical balance sheets, the market price-per-share of one com-
pany, Alpha, is $50, and that of the other company, Beta, is $25,
because the participants in the market expect Alpha's future profit-
ability to exceed Beta's. Thus, the market has assigned a lower cost
of capital to Alpha, because it can receive $50 by diluting the owner-
ship of its asset base and income stream by only one share. The cost
to Beta, in terms of dilution, however, is two times greater.
Further analyzing this hypothetical leads to an understanding of
equity financing's capital allocation advantages over internal financ-
ing and debt. Because the current conditions of companies Alpha
and Beta are identical, the market must have differentiated them
based on an expectation that deploying assets in the manner chosen
by Alpha will produce a future return (in present value terms) twice
that which deploying the same assets in the manner chosen by Beta
59 See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMIcs: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 116-17 (4th
ed. 1982) (describing elastic demand, which occurs when goods are similar and can
be traded easily).
60 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 42, at 316-16 (stating that "dilution" of
stock does not occur when "investors know that you can earn an adequate rate of
return on the new money").
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will produce. Accordingly, the market rewards Alpha because it has
found a higher valued use for the same assets than has Beta.
One crucial caveat exists regarding the model demonstrated
above: the means by which equity financing allocates capital is only
advantageous to the means by which internal or debt financing allo-
cates capital if better information is made available through the
equity market. In other words, equity financing is not advantageous
(1) if the market is not efficient or (2) if market participants do not
use the right information in pricing stocks because an insufficient
quantum and quality of information reaches its participants.
It is not the purpose of this Comment to prove that the stock
market is efficient. The Supreme Court has recognized that the mar-
ket is efficient with regard to current information, 6 1 and most schol-
ars agree.62  The fact that the market rapidly incorporates
information into share prices, however, says nothing about the qual-
ity of that information 63 or whether enough information is available
to allow the market to correctly predict a company's future pros-
pects. Hence, because the stock price is the sole mechanism for allo-
cating capital where equity financing is used, it is necessary to
examine the integrity of stock prices.
To examine the integrity of stock prices, a context and a basis
for comparison are needed. The context is set by whether a com-
pany's stock price reflects the future return on management's invest-
ment of corporate assets, as described by the Alpha/Beta
61 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1988) (acknowledging the
integrity of securities markets). An argument for market efficiency may seem to
contradict the previous argument that companies are taken over because they are
undervalued. The answer to this criticism is that the market has priced the stock to
reflect how the assets are deployed; however, the assets may not be deployed
efficiently.
62 See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 42, at 285-89; Barry, The Economics of
Outside Information and Rule lOb-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1315 (1981); Cox,
Reflections on Ex Ante Compensation and Diversification of Risk as Fairness Justifications for
Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60
TEMP. L.Q. 47, 52 (1987); Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model A
Recipefor the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374 (1984); Dent, Dual Class
Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 741-42 (1986);
Note, Insider Trading and the Corporate Acquirer: Private Actions Under Rule lOb-5 Against
Agents Who Trade on Misappropriated Information, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 600, 637
(1988).
63 See Gulf& W. Indus. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1071
(S.D.N.Y.) (stating that the "whims and caprice of the crowd" are incorporated into
share prices), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move
Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends, 71 AM. EcoN. REV. 421
(1981) (concluding that the stock market's level of volatility is unexplained).
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hypothetical. The basis for comparison is provided by the informa-
tion brought to bear on corporate investment decisions through
both the debt and internal financing processes.
To recap, in the debt financing process, only the systemic factor
of prevailing interest rates and the company-specific factor of risk of
bankruptcy are considered." Because this analysis does not involve
differentiation premised on future growth potential,65 it is based on
incomplete information. Moreover, the limited information may be
faulty. Thus, both the amount and quality of information incorpo-
rated into the price of a company's debt are inadequate.
By comparison, the equity pricing mechanism involves the
examination of a much greater quantum of information and contains
more safeguards that the information is correct. Equity markets
examine all factors which will affect expected future profitability, dis-
counted for nondiversifiable risk. In addition to prevailing interest
rates, an important consideration that equity markets have in com-
mon with debt markets, these factors include inflation expectations,
trade imbalances, economic legislation, new technology, changes in
consumer markets and demand, and pending litigation, all assessed
in light of the impact these factors have on the business that the par-
ticular company conducts.6 6 The company-specific effects can be
gleaned from the voluminous disclosures companies are forced to
make by the securities laws.67 Not only is the amount of information
greater, but the quality of the information is ensured by the highly
competitive nature of equity trading.6" As soon as new information
becomes available or old information proves inadequate, market par-
ticipants trade. The profit motive instills competition in the market,
and this ensures that information is complete and accurate.
69
Equity financing also provides better information about invest-
64 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. But see T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN
& J. WEST'BROoK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 322 (1989) (stating that creditors
frequently decide, when approving loans to a company engaged in a new venture,
that the "higher bankruptcy risk is worth the increased profits").
66 See Stout, supra note 30, at 679-80. Indeed, unlike debt markets, "an efficient
market [in equity securities] by definition reflects all information," id. at 701 n. 433,
so that equity markets require "massive amounts of information" to work properly.
Id. at 701.
67 See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
68 Auction-type exchanges usually result in the most economically efficient
capital allocation. See Bebchuk, Te Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARv. L. REV. 1028, 1048 (1982).
69 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (noting that the market rapidly
incorporates current information into stock prices).
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ment decisions than does internal financing. Equity's principal
advantage is that investors and professionals can influence a corpo-
ration's investment pattern by establishing its share price, thereby
breaking the monopoly over capital allocation decisions that corpo-
rate managers enjoy when using internal financing. Management
must be sensitive and responsive to what investors, through the mar-
ket, are telling it to do. 70 Investment professionals thus impose
information upon corporate managers which they may not otherwise
consider. Because the investing public recognizes when the corpora-
tion is investing funds inefficiently 7' and drives the stock price down
(increasing the cost of capital), management is forced to distribute
more earnings as dividends. Also, the market tempers the self-
aggrandizement motive that drives management to expand corpora-
tions even where it is inefficient to do so.7 2 This theory that external
market vigilance can affect corporate management behavior73 flows
into the discussion, undertaken below, of a second benefit of encour-
aging corporations to resort to the equity market for financing.
70 Other methods of ensuring that management is responsive to the desires of
investors include shareholder voting, mandatory disclosure statutes, independent
boards, and derivative litigation. See Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982). The assertion here, however, is that none of these is as
effective at synthesizing management and stockholder concerns as an equity
financing regime. The methods enumerated in this note have little effect on
corporate investment planning, while an equity financing regime would have a
profound influence on investment decisions.
Such a regime would allow stockholders to influence investment decisions
because management would have to go to the market to finance investments.
Stockholders would express their views on a proposed investment by trading in the
stock, thereby forcing its price higher or lower depending on the quality of the
proposed investment. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
Fiduciary duties are another historical means of making managers accountable to
shareholders. Some argue that the existence of these duties demonstrates that the
market has failed to impose accountability. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-02 (1982).
71 Stockholders would demand a greater dividend payout when they perceived
an opportunity to invest funds at a higher return than the corporation's investments
would bring. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The corporation,
however, would probably not pay the increased dividend because of the double
taxation of these payments. See infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 45-46.
73 The market has some effect on managerial decision making today. See Coffee,
supra note 56, at 1200 ("[Ilnstances of managerial inefficiency or self-dealing will not
result in a significant enough discount in the corporation's shares .... ."). A
corporation that does not have to resort to the market for financing will not be
sufficiently restrained by that market.
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B. A Greater Number of Equity Financings Would Obviate the Need for
Som, Hostile Takeovers
The discipline exerted by the equity market over corporate
investment decisions would motivate management to base these
decisions on the long-term profit potential inherent in a proposed
investment. 4 Management would be discouraged from pursuing
inefficient investment strategies for the purpose of self-aggrandize-
ment because the market would make such strategies prohibitively
expensive by lowering the stock price of the company. Similarly,
companies that wish to have access to reasonable equity financing
would have to take steps to boost their stock prices. They would
have to redeploy assets in a more efficient manner, sell off some of
the less profitable assets, or, if necessary, establish a more generous
dividend policy. All of these corporate actions would tend to raise
stock prices by aligning assets with their most valuable uses, thus
producing the same benefits that takeovers generate without the
accompanying economic and social dislocations.
Of equal importance, the products of these corporate actions,
higher stock prices and more efficiently deployed assets, take away
much of the profit motive behind takeovers. Takeovers are largely
precipitated by a raider's belief that the corporation's assets are not
creating a return commensurate with their potential.7 5 If manage-
ment were constantly under market pressure to find the right asset
allocation, however, this belief would evaporate. A second element
of the profit motive driving takeovers is the perception that corpora-
tions are not distributing enough money to shareholders. 76 The tax
disadvantage of dividends, combined with management's self-
74 See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1149 n.6 (noting that there are many cases today
in which corporations "pay[] too much because management is more interested in
increasing the size of its corporation than in maximizing value for shareholders");
Note, The Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio
Theory Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238, 1246-47 (1979) (observing that long run
investment performance of acquiring companies is generally worse than that of non-
acquiring companies, and that the value of acquirers' shares drops an average of two
percent at the announcement of an impending acquisition).
75 A Touche Ross survey revealed that bidders are especially attracted to
companies with low price-to-assets and price-to-earnings ratios. See ToucHE Ross &
Co., THE EFFECT OF MERGERS, AcQuIsrrIONS, AND TENDER OFFERS ON AMERICAN
BUSINESS: A TOUCHE Ross SURVEY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS' OPINIONS 9 (1981).
When a company has a low price-to-assets ratio relative to the market, investors
expect the company to produce sub-average returns with the assets as currently
deployed. When a company has a low price-to-earnings ratio relative to the market,
investors expect future earnings growth to be slower than the market average.
76 Bidders seek companies with large cash reserves, high liquidity, and
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aggrandizing goals, support the general corporate policy of retaining
earnings, even in cases where shareholders have the ability to invest
the funds more profitably.7 7 Corporate raiders recognize and seize
upon these situations of inefficient cash retention. In the same way,
raiders take advantage of situations in which corporations maintain
nonproductive assets.7s These situations are many, because man-
agement, which is in control of the capital allocation process, 79 does
not always accurately perceive the desirability of alternative external
investments or realize that selling assets and paying dividends are
viable alternatives. The supervision of the equity market, however,
would diminish the takeover profit motive inherent in inefficient cash
retention or asset maintenance. This is because the market would
raise the cost of capital for a corporation that did not pay dividends
or refused to sell off unprofitable assets. Corporations would there-
fore have to alter their investment strategies, pay higher dividends,
and reallocate their assets. This natural response to market-imposed
"rules" removes some of the most powerful forces driving takeovers.
Furthermore, encouraging companies to undertake equity
financing would reduce the possibility of "bust-up" takeovers, while
promoting the same asset allocation benefits of these takeovers.
8 0
Many hostile takeovers produce economic advantages associated
with trimming wasteful staff, assets, and production capacity.s
Under an equity financing regime, this process still would occur,
demanded by the market rather than imposed by the hostile raider.
Corporate management will have to respond to market pressure,
8 2
substantial unused debt capacity. See id. at 13. These factors all kidicate a company's
potential to increase payouts to its owners.
77 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX AsPECTS OF
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 85 (Jt. Comm. Print 1989) (No. JCS-1-89)
("Where shareholders are better able than the corporation to put capital to its most
productive use, a tax-based disincentive to distribute earnings creates economic
inefficiency.").
78 See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1242 (noting that takeovers can encourage "a
higher rate of asset disposition, which probably is in the best interests of
shareholders").
79 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
80 See generally Grundfest, Management Buyouts and Leveraged Buyouts: Are the Critics
Right?, U. PA. L. ALUMNI J., Winter 1989, at I1, 11-12 (enumerating the benefits of
takeovers). But see Reich, supra note 7, at 32 (contending that "[t]here is little
evidence [that] . . . mergers have on the average enhanced the profitability or
productivity of the merging enterprises").
81 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
82 Professor Coffee contends that one of the major benefits of takeover activity
is that it "constrains managerial self-dealing and inefficiency." Coffee, supra note 56,
at 1192. Under the watchful eye of corporate raiders, management must act in the
shareholder interest. In an equity financing regime, the incentive is the same. The
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and this will sometimes require making necessary cutbacks. The dif-
ference with equity market supervision is that the asset reallocation
can occur in a more orderly manner, without the displacement and
discontinuity associated with a takeover. Corporate management,
the instrument of this asset reallocation, usually has a great deal of
human capital invested in the enterprise,8 3 so it may have more con-
cern for the various constituencies involved 4 when it implements
changes.
Equity financing would force corporations to make the necessary
adjustments in asset allocation, thereby discouraging hostile take-
overs of those corporations which are managed well enough to
undertake these adjustments. Thus, the best companies in America
will not be vulnerable to takeovers because their stock prices will
fairly reflect their profit potential, leaving no residual value for raid-
ers. Dislocation of communities and workers will be more gradual
and bearable, and the companies will survive in more efficient form
to fight foreign competition.
Conversely, companies that do not respond to market cues on
asset allocation will become more vulnerable to attempts to oust
management. The market will drive down the stock price of compa-
nies which persist in inefficient policies, forcing them to dilute own-
ership of their assets significantly in order to obtain equity financing.
A greater number of shares will trade on the exchange and through
arbitrage, can come into hostile hands. A party adverse to manage-
ment then may be able to launch a proxy fight."5 Her chances of
winning would be substantial, because she can buy votes on the mar-
ket or easily solicit votes ftom other shareholders who have been
"watchful eye," however, comprises the shareholders themselves. They wield power
over management because of their ability to depress the stock price, making
expansion difficult when it is not in the best interests of shareholders.
83 My use of the term "human capital" comes from Professor Clyde Summers.
In the context of employee layoffs. he defined "human capital" as the intangible stake
one attains through long association with an enterprise. Justice Powell espoused the
idea of corporate management having human capital invested in the business and its
surrounding community. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982)
(Powell, J., concurring in part). The Borden Company provides a good example of
why "human capital" investments must be considered: Borden's management and
directors unanimously agreed and contracted to resign in the event of a takeover. See
Deutsch, From Cash Cow to Cash Mchine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
84 The other constituencies include employees, suppliers, pensioners, lower
level managers, and members of the community. See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1248.
85 A proxy fight is a means by which stockholders, by soliciting votes, can force a
change in corporate policy, oust a board of directors, or initiate a takeover deal. SeeJ.
HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM 28-30
(1987), reprinted in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 314-15.
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made acutely aware of current management's incompetence by the
fall in stock price. A hostile party also may profit from a tender offer
strategy since the inability of management to reallocate assets leaves
an exploitable discrepancy between asset and market value.
86
Any management that persists in inefficient investment decisions
or is completely incompetent will not survive. Thus the problem of
entrenched management, like the problem of inefficient asset alloca-
tion, largely will be rectified. While hostile takeovers will remain the
ultimate threat to poorly run operations,8 7 a process of market-
imposed discipline will obviate the need for hostile takeovers to pro-
duce quality organizations.
C. An Equity Financing Regime Would Create Proper Long-Term
Performance Incentives
As shown, the equity financing process beneficially affects those
structural problems which create the need for takeovers. This pro-
cess also imposes important performance incentives which can help
United States corporations meet the challenge of foreign competi-
tion. American corporations will be more competitive in interna-
tional markets with the proper long-term performance incentives
that accompany equity financing.
Incentives imposed by the current financing system do not
reward the best-performing companies in an efficient manner. This
becomes clear when examining the incentive structure of the debt
financing process. The interest rates that lenders assign to the debt
of large, stable corporations do not vary greatly.8 This means that
there may be no cost of capital variance between companies with sig-
nificant growth potential and those likely to be stagnant. One reason
for this lack of distinction is that a major component of the cost of
debt is the prevailing interest rate (prime rate) which is common to
all corporate debt regardless of growth potential. Another reason is
that risk of failure, the other component of an interest rate, often
86 As the market participants become aware of managerial inadequacies, they
will "discount the corporation's shares by a margin sufficient to trigger a takeover."
Coffee, supra note 56, at 1203.
87 Judge Friendly, appropriately, called the takeover device "the sharpest blade
for the improvement of corporate management." See Friendly, Make Haste Slowly, in
COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT 525, 532 (D. Schwartz
ed. 1979); see also Coffee, supra note 56, at 1199 (stating that "it has approached the
status of a truism . . . that hostile takeovers serve as the primary disciplinary
mechanism by which corporate managements are held accountable").
88 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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does not differ significantly between growing and stagnant
corporations. 9
Not only does the debt market fail to adequately distinguish
growth from non-growth corporations, but also when it makes such a
distinction, it often does so in an inefficient way. Inefficient in this
context means that lenders often award a lower interest rate to stable
corporations, which often hold cash reserves and accumulated assets,
than to growth companies, which often require steady influxes of
new capital.9" This is logical from the lender's perspective, but det-
rimental to the economy as a whole. When Company X's expected
return, discounted for risk of failure, is greater than that of Company
Y, it is economically efficient for Company X to have a lower cost of
capital. Yet, in the debt market, where Company Y is a stable com-
pany with greater assets than Company X, exactly the opposite result
occurs. This is because lenders focus almost exclusively on the risk
of failure, without considering the potential for future growth.91
Finally, the debt financing process creates management incen-
tives which are economically detrimental. First, the process rewards
inefficient accumulation of assets because a large asset base provides
a cushion for banks, resulting in a lower cost of capital. Combined
with the tax preference for accumulating and investing earnings9 2
and with the natural predilection of managers to aggrandize their
power,9 3 this incentive has the net effect of encouraging the alloca-
tion of capital toward assets that ideally should not receive invest-
ment capital. In many cases it may be economically beneficial for the
corporation to pay a dividend instead of buying the inefficient asset.
This would disburse the capital into the competitive marketplace,
where investors would allocate the capital to a higher valued use by
reinvesting it in corporations pursuing more efficient projects. The
flip side of the fact that the debt market encourages asset accumula-
89 See M. Fox, supra note 41, at 270-82; Note, supra note 52, at 1403-04.
90 See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 331-61 (2d ed. 1979) (noting that lenders are averse to companies who
maintain low cash reserves or leverage their assets). The authors partially attribute
this caution to the financial failures of the Depression. See id. at 355-56.
91 Professor Coffee makes the same point in a different way, characterizing debt
investors as inefficiently risk averse. See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1244-46. A
debtholder would be satisfied if the company remained equally profitable from the
first day she holds her obligation to the last. Unless the company has reached a state
of optimal asset allocation, this preference (and the resulting incentive toward
stagnation) is inefficient.
92 See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 45-46.
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tion is that it discourages taking efficient risks94 in anticipation of
future returns. Because the major distinguishing factor in pricing
debt is a corporation's risk of failure, companies are made commen-
surately more risk averse. This does not mean that companies will
never take risks; management may perceive the potential return as
sufficiently high to overcome the increased risk premium built into
its cost of debt capital. The net result of this incentive to avoid risk,
however, is that a company will demand a higher threshold return
before it will invest in a project and will be compelled to forgo other
"efficient risk" investment opportunities.
Increased use of equity financing would create economically bet-
ter performance incentives. First, and probably most importantly,
the equity market provides a means of rewarding companies that
perform well. The variance among stock prices of companies with
similar asset bases is significant; significant in that companies per-
ceived as making better use of their assets are distinguished from
their less efficient competitors in the stock market.95 This translates
into a lower cost of equity capital for companies that efficiently allo-
cate their assets, thereby inducing management to properly control
asset use. Second, companies would be forced by the market to
realign their investment strategies; shrewd market professionals will
reward companies that invest for future returns and discount those
which merely accumulate assets. Market investors, unlike commer-
cial bankers, are interested in a company's ability to increase its
future payouts, not just to maintain its current level of payments.
Thus, the incentive to incur efficient risk is clear. Third, companies
will be encouraged to take a long-term perspective on their asset
allocation strategies. While this assertion is contrary to the prevail-
ing myth that market traders are short-term oriented, this myth is
based more on hype than on coherent analysis.9 6 Equity markets
94 A project represents an "efficient risk" when the expected return on the
project, the weighted average of all the possible returns, exceeds the return
demanded by the market on projects of similar risk. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra
note 42, at 136-40.
95 The stock market (determinative of equity cost of capital) assigns a price-to-
earnings ratio ("P/E") to each company's stock. A high P/E shows that investors
think that the company has good growth opportunities, that its earnings are safe, and
that it deserves a low cost of capital. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 42, at 60-
61. Merck & Company, a successful drug company with high growth potential, has a
P/E of 20, and Ford Motor Company, also a tremendously successful, but less
dynamic company, has a P/E of 4. See New York Stock Exchange Composite Transactions,
Wall St.J.,Jan. 19, 1990, at C4. By contrast, the bond ratings (determinative of debt
cost of capital) of the two companies are equivalent.
96 See Hector, Yes, You Can Manage Long Term, FORTUNE, Nov. 21, 1988, at 64.
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reward long-term investments to the extent that the investments will
enhance a corporation's ability to increase future payouts.9 7 In con-
trast, debt markets discourage long term investments to the extent
that they involve risking -current ability to maintain payments. As
between the equity and debt markets, then, equity markets focus
more on the long term, and provide corporate managers with an
incentive to manage in that direction.
II. METHODS TO ENCOURAGE EQUrrY FINANCING BY CORPORATIONS
The capital allocation. benefits attributable to equity financing,
the performance incentives equity instills, and the respite from hos-
tile takeovers equity provides, are sufficient reasons to consider how
the legal system should be altered to encourage equity financing.
Currently, the equity market is not used by major, established corpo-
rations for financing purposes. Since this disuse can be attributed to
disincentives embodied in the tax and securities laws, changes must
be made in the regulatory framework. The following discussion sug-
gests two crucial areas for implementing changes: first, the securities
laws, which impose significant costs on corporations seeking to make
equity issuances, thereby encouraging internal financing; second, the
tax laws, which, through the double taxation of dividends and the
deductibility of interest payments, discourage equity financing in
"Executives complain that Wall Street won't let them look past the here and now.
But they're just making lame excuses. The truth is the opposite: Investors love the
future." Id. The executives who were consulted admitted a "grudging admiration of
the market's prescience." Id But see Lipton, supra note 1, at 23 ("The advent of the
highly leveraged takeover, and the defensive responses to it, have forced companies
to focus on short-term profitability rather than on capital investment .... ).
97 See Hector, supra note 96, at 68. Fortune published a study of America's twenty
largest corporations in which the stock prices were divided into two components: the
present value of the next five years' dividends (to reflect short-term prospects), and
the residual percentage of the stock price attributable to long-term prospects. The
latter category comprised over 80% of the value of most of the twenty companies'
stock. See id. An illustrative example is the Coca-Cola Company, whose five-year
dividend payout was worth only $7. The stock sold for $44, meaning that "roughly
$37 of Coke's stock price represents the market's estimate of its long-term strength."
See id.
Another Fortune study confirms investors' predilection for the long term.
Professor Woolridge of Pennsylvania State University examined market reactions
after companies announced strategic investments. See id. at 72. He found that
"investors almost always favored them." Id. Specific examples include a 3.58%
sustained rise in Walt Disney :5tock after the company announced a $2 billion
investment in EuroDisneyland, which will not likely produce returns until after 2000,
and a 2.63% sustained rise in McDonald's stock, after the chain decided to open
restaurants in Sears stores. See id.
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favor of debt financing. Admittedly the proposals offered below
might be criticized by some as interference in the market and detri-
mental to efficiency. The response to this attack is that the legal
rules as they exist today interfere with the market, and proposals
must be offered to remove inefficient impediments to the free flow of
capital.98
A. Adjustments in the Securities Laws Governing the Issuance of Equity
1. Discrepancy in Disclosure Costs between Issuing and
Non-Issuing Corporations
The registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Securities Act") impose significant costs on companies that chose to
finance through the equity markets, but not on those which finance
internally. The Securities Act thus creates an incentive to retain
earnings for internal financing of corporate expansion and a corre-
sponding disincentive to issue stock for external financing.
99
Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act") requires all registered corporations100 to make
periodic filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
101
These filings-the annual 10-K form'0 2 and the quarterly 10-Q
form' °-are intended to elicit periodic information about the state
98 See Reich, supra note 7, at 40 (stating that those "defenders of free-market
orthodoxy" who oppose intervention fail to understand that tax and securities laws as
they exist create inefficient incentives for Wall Street's "paper entrepreneurs").
99 Although debt securities, such as bonds and notes also are "securities" for
purposes of the securities laws, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a(1), 77b(l) (1988), and are
thereby subject to the same disclosure requirements upon issue as equity securities, it
is the deductibility of the interest payments on these securities, as on any debt, that
gives debt its most important advantage over equity securities.
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the disclosure requirements of
the securities laws impose costs on equity issuances and encourage internal
financing. The double taxation of dividends and deductibility of interest, which act
as a disincentive to equity financing in favor of debt, will be dealt with in the next
section.
100 A corporation is required to be registered under Section 12 of the Exchange
Act if it is listed on a national exchange or has assets exceeding $1 million and more
than 500 stockholders. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 81(g) (1988).
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988) (entitled "Periodical and other reports").
102 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1989). The form requires the following
information: the character of the registrant's business, a statement of capitalization,
the salaries of officers and directors, and detailed financial statements. See
Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations and
Guides, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630, 63,640-44 (1980).
103 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1989). The form requires the following
information: updated financial statements, changes in capitalization since the last 10-
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of a corporation's affairs.' 04 Certain significant events trigger the
obligation to file an additional explanatory 8-K form.'0 5 These sub-
stantive disclosures must be filed by all large public corporations.
Corporations seeking to obtain equity financing, however, are
required by the Securities Act to make even further detailed disclo-
sures.'0 6 It is this discrepancy between the disclosure required of
issuing and non-issuing corporations, and the resulting difference in
costs, that provides the focus for analysis. These additional costs
imposed on issuing corporations clearly represent disincentives to
use the equity market.
Companies registering an issue of securities under the Securities
Act must reveal "material changes that have occurred in the affairs of
the corporation since the filing of the last 10-K that have not been
reported in a subsequent 1O-Q or 8-K, and .. .the principal pur-
poses for which the corporation intends to use the net proceeds of
the issue. '"107 Both the "material changes" and the "principal pur-
poses" components of the Securities Act demand disclosures that
management may oppose because it does not want to reveal its plans
K filing, defaults on senior securities, and any matters which were submitted to
shareholder vote in the preceding quarter. See New Interim Financial Information
Provisions and Revision of Form 1-Qfor Quarterly Reporting, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,480,
12,486-88 (1981).
104 See SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 691 (D. Mass. 1976)
(information is designed to assist investors to decide whether to buy, sell, or hold,
and to help creditors assess registered corporations), aft'd, 552 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.
1977).
105 See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1989). A corporation must file an 8-K report upon
occurrence of the following events: a change in control, acquisition or disposition of
a significant amount of assets, bankruptcy or receivership, or a change in certifying
accountants. See Adoption of Amendment to Certain Forms and Related Rules, 42
Fed. Reg. 4424, 4429-30 (1977).
106 The information required of issuing corporations by the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988), includes the general character of the issuer's
business, a detailed statement of the company's capitalization, the salaries of the
officers and directors, the net proceeds to be derived from the issue and the proceeds
of any securities issued in the prior two years, the price at which the company expects
to make the offering, any transactions undertaken or planned to which the proceeds
of the issue may be applied, detailed financial statements, and copies of all material
contracts entered into by the corporation must be attached. See id. at § 77aa.
Compare these stringent requirements with those imposed by the Securities
Exchange Act, supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
107 See M. Fox, supra note 42, at 340. The SEC now recognizes a mechanism by
which an issuing corporation can "piggyback" the information contained in its 10-K,
10-O) and 8-K forms onto its Securities Act filings. The new short-form registration
form, the S-3, now requires only two types of new information: material changes
since the last 10-Q, and the planned use of the proceeds. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13
(1989). As the textual discussion indicates, having to disclose the planned use of the
money is an onerous managerial burden.
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to competitors or relinquish any discretion over funds-use decision
making.'0 8 Furthermore, management may fear incurring liability
for any misstatements. 109 The "material changes" requirement only
involves accelerating disclosure of information that would have to be
reported on the next quarter's 1O-Q form pursuant to Section 13 of
the Exchange Act. The additional cost of this early dissemination of
information is clearly not onerous. The "principal purposes"
requirement, on the other hand, demands significant disclosures that
represent direct costs and powerful disincentives to management of
the issuing corporation. Because money is fungible, the corporation
usually cannot specify one particular project which will be the sole
beneficiary of the stock issue proceeds .110 Thus, the "principal pur-
poses" requirement demands that management reveal all of its
short-term spending plans on a form that will be available for inspec-
tion by the public, thereby exposing the corporation's investment
strategy to its competitors."'
The cost of disclosure by management, which otherwise would
prefer to be secretive, is only the first disincentive created by the
Securities Act. The second disincentive is much more significant.
Under the Securities Act, the corporation must bear a greater risk of
liability for false or misleading statements relating to material facts
than it does under the Exchange Act. Section 18(a) of the Exchange
Act, applicable to all corporations, says that a corporation is liable to
one who, "in reliance upon the statement, shall have purchased or
sold a security at a price affected by the statement, for damages
caused by such reliance, unless [the issuer can show that it] acted in
good faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or mis-
108 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (describing management's
desire to retain unbridled discretion over corporate decision making).
109 See infra notes 112-29 and accompanying text (discussing the increased level
of liability imposed on directors and management when the corporation is issuing
securities).
110 A corporation is not likely to isolate in its treasury those funds received from
a security issuance. Thus, those funds become intermingled with money received
through debt financing or generated by operations.
111 This is not to say that this Comment bemoans the level of disclosure
required by the Securities Act. It recognizes that this information is needed by the
market to properly evaluate an issue. What is objectionable, however, is the
discrepancy of disclosure between issuing and non-issuing corporations. This lack of
uniformity creates an artificial advantage in favor of internal financing over equity
financing. Rather than eliminating disclosure, however, this Comment argues for a
uniform level of disclosure for all public corporations, whether issuing or non-
issuing. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text (discussing "integrated
disclosure").
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leading."1 12 Courts strictly construe the reliance element of this
cause of action, generally interpreting it to mean that the harmed
investor must have actually seen the document containing the mis-
leading statement." 3 This interpretation makes a class action under
Section 18(a) virtually impossible, thus limiting the company's expo-
sure. An action under Rule lOb-5, promulgated under Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act," 4 is also available to aggrieved parties."'
Such an action, however, requires a showing of scienter, 1 6 a
requirement that insulates the corporation."
7
The Securities Act, on the other hand, involves greater risk for
the issuing corporation. Section 11 of the Securities Act creates a
cause of action for anyone purchasing a security the registration
statement for which either (1) omits a fact required to be stated or
(2) contains a false or misleading statement."" Neither reliance nor
scienter need be shown, and. no affirmative defense is available to the
issuing corporation." 9 This Section, generous to plaintiffs, makes a
112 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988).
113 See Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 438 F. Supp. 190, 195 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). Section 18 provides a remedy for damages caused by reliance on a misleading
statement contained in a document or report filed with the SEC. See Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 269-70 (3rd Cir. 1978) (deciding that a
plaintiff must allege actual reliance on false and misleading statements, in particular,
reports or documents on file with the SEC), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968), (holding that constructive reliance is not
sufficient), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
114 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1988).
115 Rule lOb-5 makes it illegal:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
116 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (holding that "scienter is an
element of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, regardless of the identity of the
plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought").
117 The corporation, along with its officers and directors, is protected by the
scienter requirement of a lOb-5 action from liability for negligent or inadvertent
misstatements. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 689-93 (stating that scienter involves intent,
not mere negligence); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)
(defining scienter as "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
18 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
119 See id at § 77k(a). With regard to section 1 (a), "Congress created express
liability regardless of the defendant's fault." Hochfelter 425 U.S. at 200. The issuer is
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class action feasible and liability absolute.12 Clearly, the increased
risk imposed by Section 11 of the Securities Act as compared to Sec-
tion 18 of the Exchange Act represents a significant cost and creates
a disincentive for equity financing.
121
Managers' and directors' risk of liability is also much greater if
the corporation elects to make an equity issuance. Under the Securi-
ties Act, a corporation is absolutely liable for registration misstate-
ments. 122 In addition, the burden of proof shifts when a corporation
registers an equity issue under the Securities Act. Under Section
18(a) of the Exchange Act, applicable to all registered corporations,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant director or manager caused
the misleading statement to be made. 123 Similarly, under the univer-
sally applicable Rule lOb-5 action, a plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the officer or director "aided or abetted" in making the false
statement.1 24 But, when a corporation registers an issuance of stock
under the Securities Act, each director and officer is jointly and sev-
erally liable with the strictly-liable corporation unless she can prove
the elements of the "due diligence" defense. This defense requires
that the officer or director show that she conducted a sufficiently
thorough investigation into the veracity of the facts, and that based
on this investigation, she reasonably believed the statements were
true. 1
25
Shifting the burden of proof onto the officers and directors
increases their risk of liability, translating into either a direct expo-
sure cost or an indirect cost in the form of more rigorous (and often
absolutely liable for misleading statements contained in the registration statement.
See iai
120 Professor Fox says that Section 11 facilitates suits because:
(1) For a period of one year after the filing, plaintiffs need not show actual
reliance, which allows for class actions;
(2) The plaintiff does not have to show scienter, and there are no defenses
allowed, so liability is virtually absolute. M. Fox, supra note 41, at 344.
121 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933) (reporting that Congress
meant Section 11 to place "a heavier legal liability" on issuing corporations).
122 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988) (Section 11 of the Securities Act); supra notes
118-20 and accompanying text (discussing how Section 11 creates absolute liability
for material omissions or false or misleading statements on registration statements).
123 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) ("Any person who shall make or cause to be
made" a misstatement shall be liable.).
124 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 684 (1980) (stating that plaintiff had to show
that defendant "violated or aided and abetted violations" of Rule 10b-5).
125 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1988); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 208 (1976) (stating that officers and directors are allowed a defense against
civil liability "based on the exercise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable
belief that the registration statement was not misleading").
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redundant) investigation and higher insurance premiums. The
officers and directors-the financing decision makers-are inclined
to avoid this cost and opt for internal financing.
The legislative history of Section 11 reveals that, as a whole, the
liability scheme of that section is designed to induce all participants
in the issuing process to expose the true facts about the issuing cor-
poration. 126 In large part throughout its history, Section 11 has suc-
ceeded in assuring -the veracity of registration statement
disclosures,' 27 albeit at the possible expense of frightening potential
issuers from the equity market. Until quite recently, with the enact-
ment of reforms aimed at integrated disclosure, 128 the imposition
upon underwriters of a due diligence responsibility provided added
insurance that disclosures were complete and accurate. Underwrit-
ers saddled with potential liability undertook thorough, independent
investigations of the issuer. This practice, however, is waning as
integrated disclosure works its way into the securities system.' 29 The
SEC's experiment in integrated disclosure has the potential to
remove some of the disincentives for equity financing contained in
the disclosure/liability scheme of the federal securities laws. If
poorly implemented, however, the program could have the conse-
quence of causing a greater number of incomplete or inaccurate
registration statements to be filed. This potential adverse effect
would undercut the goal of insuring complete disclosure. Hence,
the proper implementation of this program, discussed next, is
crucial.
2. Levelling the Playing Field Through Integrated Disclosure
In the 1980s the SEC adopted a number of rules and regulations
126 See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 121, at 3 (explaining that the legislation
sought "full disclosure of every essentially important element attending the issue ofa
new security").
127 See generally M. Fox, supra note 41, at 339-67. A recurrent theme in Fox's
argument in favor of integrated disclosure is that the strict standards imposed by
Section I 1 encourage issuers, underwriters, and the lawyers for both to take the
utmost care in preparing registration statements.
128 See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
129 After the integrated disclosure system was put in place, the Securities
Industry Association undertook a survey which found that only 9% of underwriters
believed they were performing as much due diligence as before integrated disclosure.
See Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its Impact Upon Underwriters' Due
Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 33 & n.92 (1983). The
survey also revealed that only 13% of companies engaged underwriters in preparing
10-Ks, and that the percentage was significantly lower for both 10-Qs and 8-Ks. See
id.
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designed to lower the cost to companies making public offerings.
The integrated disclosure program, as these changes are called, is
comprised of three components. First, the SEC now allows large
corporations to use a short Form S-3 as its registration form.1 30 The
S-3 incorporates by reference the corporation's latest 10-K and sub-
sequently filed 10-Qs and 8-Ks, which reduces the professional fees
that once were involved in preparing a voluminous set of new docu-
ments. Second, the SEC no longer reviews most S-3 registration
statements, and such statements often become effective after only
two days.1 3' This accelerated process eliminates costly delay. Third,
a shelf registration technique allows a corporation to issue a series of
securities over a two year period without having to refile.'3 2 Rule
415'13 allows the issuer to name several underwriters on the regis-
tration statement, any of which will be permitted to compete for each
series of the issuance. Hence, the company effectively can maintain
an inventory of securities that it can sell whenever it wishes and to
whichever investment bank will offer it the best terms.
134
The integrated disclosure program removes some equity financ-
ing disincentives. The mechanical costs of producing new docu-
ments is greatly reduced, and the accompanying ability to time an
offering is attractive to companies. Major disincentives, however,
still remain. A corporation making an equity offering must subject
itself to the Securities Act's increased exposure to liability. Issuing
corporations also still must make "principle purpose" disclosures
because the S-3 form does not dispose of the requirement that the
issuer reveal how it plans to use the sale proceeds.
Moreover, integrated disclosure has the disadvantage of under-
cutting the multi-leveled process that ensures the integrity of regis-
130 See M. Fox, supra note 41, at 350-51 (citing Securities Act Release No. 6383).
131 See id. at 351.
132 See id. at 351-52. The issuer need not amend its filing unless there is a
fundamental change in the information initially reported. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415
(1989). This updating requirement is consistent with a longstanding SEC policy
against allowing the sale of securities based on old information. See, e.g, In re
Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 S.E.C. 109, 113-14 (1941) (holding that Securities Act
§ 6(a) suggests a policy against stale information).
133 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1989).
134 The effect of Rule 415 is to permit an issuer that wishes to sell some or
all of the registered securities at any point during the two year period to
contact the several managing underwriters named in the registration
statement, determine which underwriter will give it the best terms, and offer
the security to the market through that underwriter in a matter of hours.
Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic
Analysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005, 1005 n.4 (1984).
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tration disclosures;13 5 expediting the process of marketing securities
to the public increases the chances that misleading registration state-
ments will be filed. The SEC's chosen path for making the securities
markets more accessible thus may have resulted in reducing the man-
dated level of disclosure. ]Indeed, although the SEC denies that
underwriter investigation has become less intense, the facts show
otherwise.
3 6
There need not be this tradeoff between removing impediments
from the market and loosening disclosure requirements. The SEC
should seek to merge the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Act with those of the Exchange Act, while aiming for the higher stan-
dard of disclosure imposed by the Securities Act.'3 7 This would
involve requiring all corporations, along with their officers and direc-
tors, to make more complete regular Exchange Act disclosures and
accept a higher risk of liability. The objective would be to level the
playing field between those companies seeking access to the equity
market and those still choosing to finance internally. This equaliza-
tion would result in somewhat higher transaction costs for all public
corporations, but it also should produce a higher quality of informa-
tion for the efficient market i:o digest, and corporations would bene-
fit in the aggregate.
Merging the two acts would require applying the liability stan-
dards imposed by the Securities Act to all corporations. Accord-
ingly, officers and directors of a corporation financing internally
would be liable for disclosure violations under the stringent require-
ments of the Securities Act. In other words, if an officer or director
of a violating company could not meet the due diligence defense, she
would be open to liability.' 33
The basic objectives of the merger proposal are to impose the
same level of liability upon, and require the same level of disclosure
135 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
137 Professor Fox is a strong advocate of total integration of the disclosure
required of issuing corporations by the Securities Act with that required of all listed
corporations by the Securities Exchange Act. See M. Fox, supra note 4 1, at 358-67; see
also Fox, supra note 134, at 1009 (stating that "the SEC should develop ways to put
the same kinds of pressures on issuers when they prepare Exchange Act periodic
reports as underwriters historically placed on them when the issuers prepared
Securities Act registration statements").
138 Holding officers and directors liable for failure to meet due diligence
standards is consistent with Delaware Supreme Court policy. See Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (concluding that the defense that an action
was a "business judgment" does not protect those who fail to do the necessary
research).
EQUITY FINANCING
from, all registered corporations, whether or not they make public
offerings. The objectives can be accomplished practically by utilizing
the 10-K forms corporations are required to file annually and the 10-
Q forms they must file quarterly. Directors, officers, and underwrit-
ers would have to certify the information contained in the forms and
subject themselves to liability for disclosure violations. In addition,
the forms might be altered to ask some questions pertaining to short-
term financing plans, as this information would be required by the
Securities Act, so as to eliminate disclosure discrepancies. Most
actions for a disclosure violation could be brought derivatively, with
the incentive to do so being the potential under state law for attor-
ney's fees.' 39 Ideally, an efficient enforcement mechanism will
develop, as it has in the case of Section 16(b) violations.'
40
B. Removal of the Tax Incentive Favoring Debt Financing Over Equity
Financing
Properly adjusting the securities laws would go a long way
toward removing the disincentives to equity financing in favor of
internal financing by removing the additional costs imposed on
equity issuances under the current regulatory regime. This adjust-
ment, however, would correct only part of the problem. The ineffi-
cient incentives favoring debt financing over equity financing lie not
in the securities laws, but in the tax law. Hence, the tax laws also
must be adjusted to encourage equity financing.
The tax law currently favors debt financing by allowing deduct-
ibility of corporate interest payments. Section 163(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code states that for corporations, "[t]here shall be allowed
as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on
indebtedness."' 4 ' By contrast, there is no such deduction for distri-
139 Under Delaware law, the corporation must pay the costs and attorneys' fees
for any successful plaintiff in a derivative action. See, e.g., Allied Artists Pictures v.
Baron, 413 A.2d 876, 878 (Del. 1980) (awarding costs and attorneys' fees to
successful plaintiff in derivative suit); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 105 A.2d 461,
462 (Del. 1954) (same). Commentators realize that without attorneys' fees paid by
the corporation, "few shareholders would pay attorneys' fees out of their own
pockets to finance a suit that... normally holds only slight and indirect benefit for
the plaintiff." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 43, at 1018.
140 Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, when a
corporate insider, or 10% holder, profits by purchasing and selling the company's
stock within a six month period, the company may recover the profits. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1988). There are law firms, especially in the Southern District of New York
where 16(b) actions are brought, that specialize in tracking the purchases and sales of
insiders and large shareholders.
141 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982).
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bution of dividends. In general, corporate profits are taxed once at
the entity level when they are earned and reported by the corpora-
tion, and again under Section 301 when they are distributed to the
owners. 1
4 2
The deductibility of interest payments compared to the double
taxation of distributed corporate earnings creates an inefficient
advantage for debt financing. Economically, interest on debt and
dividend payments are equivalents from the corporate perspective-
both represent the cost of funds. The tax code, however, chooses to
draw a distinction, providing a debt subsidy worth in dollar terms the
amount of interest payments multiplied by the marginal tax rate.
The consequences of this subsidy are powerful enough nearly to
eradicate the equity market as a viable source of corporate financ-
ing.143 The greater tax burden on equity obviates all of the advan-
tages of equity financing described earlier in this paper, the most
important of which is efficient capital allocation. The efficient equity
market cannot provide economic advantages unless it is used, and it
will not be used as long as the competing supplier of external corpo-
rate funds, the debt market, is given a significant (34%) tax
advantage. 1
44
There are three ways to remedy the artificial debt advantage,
thereby rendering the decision between debt and equity one which
corporations can make on the basis of real economic factors. The
first alternative is to make interest on corporate debt nondeductible.
This would involve eliminating Section 163(a), which expressly
allows the deduction, and amending Section 162 to state that interest
payments are not to be construed as "ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses." 1 45 This approach derives from the premise that the
142 See I.R.C. § 301(c) (1982) (providing that dividends are to be included in a
shareholder's gross income). Influential commentators have proposed that the
individual and corporate levels of tax on a corporation's earnings be integrated so as
to eliminate the double taxation on dividends. See Surrey, Reflections on "Integration "of
Corporation and Individual Incomes, 28 NAT'L Tax J. 335, 336-38 (1975); Warren, The
Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Taxes, 94 HARv. L. REV. 717, 736-38,
772-75 (1981).
143 See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 23 (stating that double taxation of dividends is
why companies prefer debt to equity); Murray, supra note 16, at A18 (noting that
businessmen and lawmakers worry that the tax code encourages debt by allowing
companies to deduct interest payments but not their dividends).
144 See I.R.C. § 1(b)(1)(C) (CCH 1989) (the marginal tax rate on corporate
income in excess of $75,000 per year is 34%).
145 See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982). Interest payments might be construed as
deductible business expenses unless such payments are expressly excluded from
§ 162.
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interest paid deduction is a tax expenditure, and the government
should not subsidize debt incurrence.
The second alternative to rationalize the choice between debt
and equity is to create a deduction from corporate income for divi-
dends paid.14 The Code already contains a similar deduction, as
Section 247 allows a corporate-level deduction for dividends paid on
certain preferred stock of public utilities.147 The creation of a gener-
ally applicable dividend deduction would involve writing a new code
section and abandoning, in large measure, the concept of double
taxation of corporate earnings, because most earnings are either
invested or distributed. Under the present tax system, invested earn-
ings are either capitalized and depreciated under Section 263 148 or
currently deductible under Section 162. Creating a deduction for
distributed earnings as dividends paid thus would leave little to be
taxed at the corporate level.
Creation of a dividends paid deduction derives from a more log-
ical premise than does removing the deduction for interest pay-
ments. First, both dividends and interest expenses are, after all,
business expenses from the corporate perspective. Dividends are the
price the company must pay to obtain funds from the equity market,
and interest is the price it must pay to borrow funds from the debt
market. Second, creating the new deduction would more likely
result in the benefits described earlier. Specifically, takeovers would
be discouraged because stock prices would rise in accordance with
the increase in aggregate dividend rates.
Unfortunately, the creation of a new deduction would likely have
adverse, possibly debilitating, revenue consequences. The revenue
loss associated with a dividends paid deduction would be mitigated
by the increased taxed assessed at the shareholder level, as the rate
of dividend payments increased. Furthermore, eventually there
would be a revenue gain from the general improvement in asset allo-
cation, resulting in better corporate performance and more aggre-
gate earnings to be distributed. Nevertheless, these arguments are
146 This is generally the approach favored by Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Alan Greenspan. See Wessel, Greenspan Wants to Keep Deductibility of Interest Payments by
Corporations, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1989, at A3, col. 1. Greenspan wants to "reduce the
taxes shareholders pay on dividends." Id His ultimate objectives are to "remove the
tax incentives for companies to rely on debt," and to "encourage equity financing."
Id The stock market rose over 25 points on the day Greenspan announced his
position. See Stock Market Data Bank, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1989, at G2, col. 4.
147 See I.R.C. § 247 (1982).
148 See I.R.C. § 263 (1982).
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not likely to convince a deficit-conscious legislature to enact a divi-
dends paid deduction. 149
The third alternative for correcting the debt advantage is a com-
promise. A partial dividends paid deduction (say, 50%) could be
combined with a commensurately limited interest paid deduction 5 0
under Section 163. This would eliminate tax considerations in the
choice between debt and equity financing, thus allowing the corpora-
tion to choose on the basis of real economic factors. Forcing corpo-
rate choice based on real economic factors should increase both the
use of equity financing and the corresponding capital allocation ben-
efits associated with equity.
CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing, it appears as if market forces are turn-
ing away from the debt binges of the 1980s. The "junk bond" mar-
ket has collapsed, and with it has fallen the firm responsible for its
creation. 51 As a result, some Wall Street executives are predicting a
new era based on conservative practices and a renewed fondness for
equity financing.1 - 2 These developments, however, do not obviate
the need to change the regulatory structure to encourage equity
financing by public corporations. The reasons enumerated in this
Comment for encouraging equity financing are too important to be
149 Tax experts at the Treasury Department are working on a plan to eliminate
the double taxation of dividends. To offset the revenue loss of such a tax break, they
are also considering "changes that might boost some corporations' taxes." See
Murray, supra note 16, at A18. One option being looked at would not only eliminate
the double taxation of dividends, but also tax interest payments made to pension
funds and other tax-exempt entities. See id.
150 Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady has proposed a compromise approach.
See Bimbaum & Duke, Tax Writers Move on Plan to Curb LBOs, Wall St. J.,Jan. 26, 1989,
at A2, col. 2 (stating that Brady espouses "a two-pronged plan that would curtail tax
benefits for corporate debt while creating a tax break for dividends"). However,
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan opposes the compromise, arguing that
"[t]inkering with the interest deduction has too many potential adverse side effects."
Wessel, supra note 146, at A3.
Professor Reich advocates this "partial deductibility" approach. He suggests
allowing a deduction for all corporate payouts not in excess of the Federal Funds
rate, plus two percentage points. See Reich, supra note 7, at 40. Chairman Greenspan
objects to imposing what amouns to a tax penalty upon risky loans, saying, "We
must resist the temptation to seek to allocate credit to specific uses through the tax
system." Wessel, supra note 146, at A3.
151 See Sicinolf, Power, Cohen & Guenther, Rise and Fall: Wall Street Era Ends As
Drexel Burnham Decides to Liquidate, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 6; see also
Miller, Gleizes & Bradburn, The Downfall of Drexel, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 50.
152 See Sicinolf, Power, Cohen & Guenther, supra note 151, at Al; Lowenstein,
Firms Expected to Rely Much More on Stock Sales, Wall St.J., Feb. 14, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
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left to chance, and a fully effective regime cannot be implemented
without legislative changes.
It is important to recognize that the most novel and significant
challenges facing America in the 1990s and beyond are economic in
nature. Lawmakers must be cognizant of the long-range strategic
effects of the legislation they propound in response to these chal-
lenges. If they do not adequately study the economic effects of the
legal incentives they create, their negligence will come back to haunt
future generations, as mistakes made by past decision makers are
haunting America today.

